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The purpose of this paper is to expand the research on momentum strategies in 
the securities market. Specifically, it examines the momentum anomaly in respect to the 
commodity futures market, and closely follows recent work as studied by Miffre and Rallis 
(2007). This study identifies one statistically significant short term (1 to 12 months) 
momentum strategy yielding a return of 7.7% a year. This return is found to be substantially 
higher during specific periods of the sample. The strategy’s average abnormal gain caused by 
the continuation of returns is shown to be robust to the risk based explanations posited by 
many authors of the topic. Since the risk explanations do not hold for the momentum 
anomaly, the alternative explanation indicates towards market inefficiency. The results from 
this study indicate that market inefficiency is a plausible explanation for momentum profits 
as realised. Specifically, the abnormal profits seem to be a consequence of irrational investor 
behaviour, which tends to lead to an under-reaction to new market information. 
 
Keywords:  Momentum, contrarian, efficient market hypothesis, overreaction hypothesis, 
under-reaction hypothesis, irrational investors
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1 Introduction  
The momentum anomaly remains one of the most researched patterns within average return 
studies. Most authors concede that it is not explainable by the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). The most common explanation for the 
presence of the momentum anomaly is that stocks with high (low) realised returns will be 
those that have high (low) expected returns (Berk et al., 1999 and Conrad and Kaul, 1998). 
This suggests that momentum strategy profitability can result from the cross-sectional 
variability in expected returns. This variability highlights greater portfolio risk. The second 
popular explanation is based around irrational agents, which cause inefficiency in the market 
(Daniel et al., 1998; Barberis et al., 1998). 
Although the continuation of returns in the equity market has been extensively studied and 
proven by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) over the short-term (1-12 months), recent studies 
have shown evidence of this anomaly in other markets. This study builds on the findings by 
Miffre and Rallis (2007), who show that momentum strategies are obtainable in the 
commodity futures market over similar time frames as those demonstrated in the equities 
market.  
Momentum strategies appear to be well suited to the futures market for the following reasons; 
firstly, transaction costs have been described by Locke and Venkatesh (1997) as being 
considerably less than in equities markets. Secondly, the equities research for momentum 
strategies uses hundreds and sometimes thousands of stocks (Miffre and Rallis, 2007). This 
study only uses twelve futures contracts, and therefore the cost of implementing these 
strategies is significantly less expensive and complicated. Finally, while equities are 
sometimes subject to short selling restriction (which is an integral part of these strategies), no 
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such restrictions apply in the futures market where taking short and long positions are 
seamless transactions. 
Whilst the strategies do identify profitability over the sample period, they are not as 
numerous as Miffre and Rallis (2007) who discover 13 profitable strategies. Only one of the 
16 strategies examined generates a statistically significant result. This strategy is based on a 
portfolio where contracts are ranked one month prior to formation and then held for one 
month after formation. It proves to be the most successful strategy not only over the entire 
sample period, but also over two of the three sub-periods analysed. 
The profits generated from the momentum strategies analysed are shown to be robust to the 
risk-based explanation for the momentum anomaly offered by Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002) and Conrad and Kaul (1998). As previously mentioned the next explanation for the 
continuation of returns is derived from market inefficiencies. This breach in market 
efficiency materialises through irrational investor’s under-reacting to new information in the 
market, causing prices to rise (or fall) above (below) the market equilibrium or true value of 
the asset. This research lends support to this idea, on the grounds that momentum returns are 
robust to the risk explanations. 
2 Literature Review 
Over the last three decades a substantial amount of research has been conducted on the 
profitability of contrarian and momentum strategies in the equities market. Researchers have 
identified profits from momentum strategies within differing time horizons. Intermediate (3-
12 months) horizons based on the continuation of returns, and long-run (12-36 months) 
contrarian strategies that rely on stock market returns have been examined for 
momentum/contrarian returns. More recently this research has employed futures markets (Erb 
and Harvey, 2006; Miffre and Rallis, 2007; Shen et al., 2007). 
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2.1 Under and over reaction in the stock market and market inefficiency 
Over the last twenty years strong evidence has surfaced suggesting that in violation of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis1, security prices overreact to events and information (Cooper et 
al., 2004; Daniel et al., 1998; Barberis et al., 1998; Dissanaike, 1997). The idea that investor 
sentiment can be biased towards information means that it may be possible to form strategies 
that exceed normal profits by studying past data alone.  
Strategies that exploit the notion that investors overreact to news and events, causing prices 
to drift away from their true value and then ultimately reverse in the long run (3-5 years), 
have been extensively studied by De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) demonstrate, using the US securities market, that over holding periods of between 
three to five years, stocks that performed poorly over the previous three to five years achieve 
higher returns than stocks that displayed superior gains over the same period. This research 
pioneered a series of studies that examined the profitability of contrarian strategies in 
securities markets.  
Contrarian strategies involve investing in assets exhibiting historically negative returns, and 
short selling those showing positive returns. The mentality behind this is that in accordance 
with overreaction hypothesis, prices become over or under valued and reversal back to an 
assets fundamental value is imminent. The Overreaction hypothesis has been described by 
Nam et al. (2001) as the result of investors systematically overacting to market news with 
both pessimism and optimism, resulting in a mispriced asset. Conrad and Kaul (1998) as well 
as Bayats and Cakici (1998) present profitable contrarian strategies (i.e. the utilisation of 
overreaction hypothesis) over long horizons (3-5 years)2. 
1Efficient Market Hypothesis is the theory that market prices fully reflect all information available as stated by 
Fama (1970). Therefore studying the past prices of an asset will provide no added benefit if this hypothesis 
holds in the market.  
2 For further evidence of profitable contrarian strategies see (Ball and Kothari, 1989, Chopra et al., 1992, 
Dissanaike, 1997, Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995, Poterba and Summers, 1988). 
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Momentum trading is another behaviourally driven strategy that relies on the proposal that 
investor behaviour can create inefficiency in the market. One of the more popular 
explanations for momentum profits comes from the idea that investor’s under-react to 
information in the short run causing price continuation in the intermediate term (3-12months) 
(Chan et al., 1996; Hong and Stein, 1999). This anomaly has been described as being a result 
of prices reacting too slowly to new information or events in the market (Hong et al., 2000; 
Barberis et al., 1998; Chan et al., 1996). Momentum investors therefore structure their 
portfolios to include assets that have previously performed well and short sell those that have 
generated poor returns. Bernard and Thomas (1989) provide evidence of the under-reaction 
hypothesis3 through studying a cross-section of returns in the US stock market.  
Various authors have proposed behavioural models that account for the previously discussed 
anomalies shown to exist in investor rationale (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; 
Hong and Stein, 1999). Both Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis et al. (1998) attempt to model 
the existing evidence on over/under-reaction, with a view to predicting when these 
inconsistencies in price behaviour will occur. Although both of these papers concede that the 
empirical evidence is indicative of short run continuations and long run reversals, their 
definitions of over/under-reactions slightly differ. Barberis et al. (1998) takes the view that 
under-reaction is the product of a conservatism bias, where investors are slow to change their 
beliefs in light of new evidence, and overreaction is the result of what is known as 
“representative heuristic”. This has been described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) as “the 
tendency for individuals to evaluate an uncertain event, or a sample to the degree to which it 
is similar to the parent population”. 
3 Under-reaction Hypothesis is a description of investor’s behavioural inclinations to under react to news 
causing prices to adjust slowly to the new information, which results in short term continuation. (Chan et al., 
1996, Conrad and Kaul, 1998, Hong and Stein, 1999, Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). 
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Barberis et al. (1998) argue that representative heuristic may lead investors to mistakenly 
conclude that firms realising high earnings growth will continue to do so in the future 
resulting in an overreaction effect. 
Daniel et al. (1998) form their model around the premise that investors are overconfident 
about private information causing long term (3-5 year) price reversals. They account for price 
continuation as being the product of attribution theory (Bem, 1965), where individuals over-
weight information that confirms the validity of their previous actions, resulting in an 
attribution bias. Hong and Stein (1999) attempt to model the same anomalies as Barberis et 
al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998), but rather than analysing the behaviour of  investors, they 
consider two groups of investors who trade on different information sets. Specifically, “news 
watchers” make forecasts based on signals about future cash flows but ignore information in 
the past history of prices. “Momentum traders” on the other hand, trade based on a limited 
history of prices. In addition they do not consider fundamental information. 
2.2 Momentum profits in the securities markets 
In the 1990s momentum profits were extensively illustrated in the securities markets over 
investment periods of three to twelve months. (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 2001; Conrad and Kaul, 1998; Chan et al., 1996; Rouwenhorst, 1998). Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) were perhaps the first to report significant abnormal profits based on 
momentum trading in the US stock market. Using a strategy that has become widely adopted 
in this field, at the beginning of each month they rank each stock by its previous return during 
a given “Ranking” period. The stocks are then sorted into deciles. A strategy is employed 
involving buying the stocks in the top deciles and selling those in the bottom. This position is 
held for up to twelve months. From a set of sixteen portfolios that range from ranking/holding 
periods of between three to twelve months, they report an average return of 1% per month 
(12% per annum nominal).  
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Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) demonstrate that their profits from these strategies are not 
derived from systematic risk, which some academics such as De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and 
Grundy and Martin (2001) argue are the source of momentum profits. They dismiss this 
claim by showing that the risk in terms of beta for the past “loser” portfolios is actually 
higher than that of the past “winners”. Hence the abnormal returns are not a compensation for 
picking risky stocks. Also corresponding to under-reaction hypothesis, a contributing factor 
of the momentum profits found was the delayed price reaction to firm-specific information 
which is indicative of market inefficiency. 
As further evidence of the robustness of the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) study, Jegadeesh 
and Titman, (2001) demonstrate that between 1993 and 1998 momentum strategies continued 
to be profitable to a similar degree as those of previous research, dispelling any suggestions 
of data mining.  Conrad and Kaul (1998) offer a rather viable description of the sources of 
such momentum profits. They produce evidence suggesting that momentum profits are in fact 
attributable to the cross-sectional variations in expected returns, rather than to any time series 
dependence in returns. Their bootstrap analysis suggests that the magnitude of momentum 
profits found in the actual data can be obtained with randomly generated data constructed to 
have no time-series dependence whatsoever.  
Conrad and Kauls' (1998) results (in line with Berk et al., 1999) indicate that momentum 
profits are possible in an efficient market as long as the cross-sectional variation in 
unconditional expected returns is large, relative to the variation in unexpected returns. If this 
holds, past winners are likely to consist primarily of stocks with high expected returns and 
past losers are likely to consist of stocks with low expected returns, implying positive 
expected returns for a momentum strategy. However if the primary reason for the profitability 
of momentum strategies was cross-sectional differences in mean returns, then past winners 
(or losers) should continue to be superior (or inferior) performers indefinitely into the future 
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(Shen et al., 2007; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). Contradictory to this, many studies (Chan et 
al., 2000; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001; Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt, 1999; Rouwenhorst, 1998) demonstrate that momentum strategies are only 
profitable for the first twelve months after formation. 
As a direct response to the Conrad and Kaul (1998) findings, Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) 
released a study that specifically disproves the latter’s hypothesis. They demonstrate that 
Conrad and Kaul's (1998) bootstrap analysis was subject to a small sample bias, and prove 
that without this bias, cross-sectional differences in expected returns explain little, if any, of 
the momentum profits. They posit these returns are attributable to the time series dependence 
of realised returns (also Chen and Hong, 2002). Furthermore Grundy and Martin (2001) 
provide evidence that cross-sectional differences in expected returns are not the primary 
reason for the momentum phenomenon, even though it may have some contribution to the 
results. 
A popular rationalisation for momentum profits is that they are a simple compensation for 
bearing more risk (Li et al., 2008). Although it has been shown that profits from long term 
reversals are not robust to risk adjustments (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004; Fama and French 
1996), intermediate (3-12 months) return continuation has been a more durable anomaly for 
risk explanations. Fama and French (1996) note that their three factor asset-pricing model 
does not explain continuation in short term returns. This was confirmed by Grundy and 
Martin (2001) who demonstrate that the Fama and French (1996) three factor model is unable 
to explain mean returns from momentum strategies. In other words, the momentum strategies 
profitability cannot be attributed to being a reward for being exposed to the factors in the 
Fama and French (1993) risk factor model4.  
4 The Fama and French (1993) market model identifies three common stock-market factors that explain the 
expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk free rate: an overall market factor; factors related to firm size, 
and book-to-market equity.  
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Several studies look at the role that time-varying systematic risk plays in explaining 
momentum profits (Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002; Griffin et al., 2003; Grundy and Martin, 
2001; Lewellen and Nagel, 2006; Wu, 2002). Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) demonstrate 
that profits obtained from momentum strategies may be explained by a set of common 
macroeconomic variables that are related to the business cycle. 
They use the dividend yield, default spread, yield on three-month T-bills, and term structure 
spread as a standard set of macroeconomic variables known to predict market returns. Results 
indicate that the returns from momentum strategies diminish once these variables are 
accounted for. This evidence is consistent with the notion of time-varying market risk being a 
reasonable explanation for stock price continuation. However, in contrast to these findings, 
Griffin et al. (2003) find profitable momentum strategies in various markets during both 
strong and weak economic periods. They interpret this as evidence that macroeconomic risk 
does not contribute to momentum profits. Moreover, they provide international evidence that 
price continuation only exists in the short term (as previously cited), which is inconsistent 
with these risk-based explanations.  
A final explanation for the momentum profits as previously shown is that they are in fact 
false once the transaction costs are accounted for (Korajczyk and Sadka; 2004, Lesmond et 
al., 2004). Lesmond et al. (2004) compares the momentum returns for Hong et al. (2000), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001). They note the estimates of transaction costs as used in 
these studies are based on the costs of trading relatively large liquid stocks, while the stocks 
that produce a large portion of the profits for the portfolios are not of this type. Therefore the 
trading costs used in these studies are found to be underestimated and momentum profits are 
actually much lower. In fact Lesmond et al. (2004) demonstrates that transaction costs exceed 
the momentum profits. Similarly, Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) stress the importance of 
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accounting for market liquidity and trading costs when evaluating momentum strategies. 
They further describe how although transaction costs do diminish momentum profits, they do 
not fully explain the persistence of past winner stocks in the strategies. 
2.3 Momentum profits in the Futures market 
Since the securities and futures markets are intrinsically different, there are some strong 
justifications for applying momentum strategies to futures contracts (Miffre and Rallis, 2007; 
Shen et al., 2007). There are three distinct differences in the two markets that have significant 
implications for the execution of momentum strategies. Firstly, the transaction costs in the 
futures markets are substantially lower than the stock market (Fleming et al., 1996; Locke 
and Venkatesh, 1997). For example, Locke and Venkatesh (1997) discovered that transaction 
costs in the futures markets range from 0.0004% to 0.033%, which is substantially less than 
the 2.3% estimated for the equity markets (Lesmond et al., 2004). As discussed previously, 
there is a coterie of academics (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004; Lesmond et al., 2004) that 
present evidence of momentum returns being reduced by transaction costs. Therefore, the 
diminishing effect that transaction costs have on momentum profits in the securities markets 
should be less prevalent with futures contracts (Miffre and Rallis, 2007). 
Another important point to discuss in the context of futures momentum is the ability to easily 
take short positions in their portfolios. Momentum strategies in equities rely on using the 
proceeds from selling assets that are falling in price to purchase assets that are believed to be 
increasing in price (Conrad and Kaul, 1998). This has significant implications because as 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), Hong et al (2000), and Lesmond et al. (2004) note, the 
majority of momentum returns are generated through the loser stocks which are being short 
sold. In the futures market, taking a short position, which is contractually agreeing to deliver 
the underlying commodity at a future date, incurs the same costs and effort as taking a long 
position (Miffre and Rallis, 2007; Shen et al., 2007).  
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Additionally, the futures market is generally more liquid than that of the securities market, 
allowing momentum trading to take place instantaneously. Momentum in the securities 
market has been demonstrated by Rouwenhorst (1998) to be more prevalent in smaller and 
less liquid stocks. On the other hand, the futures contracts studied in this work exhibit deep 
liquidity driven by large trading volumes. 
Finally, unlike stocks, futures contracts are not linked to claims by corporations and their 
announcements. They also have different exposures to macroeconomic factors (Gorton and 
Rouwenhorst, 2006; Jensen et al., 2002; Shen et al., 2007). Furthermore, Bodie and Rosansky 
(1980) as well as Edwards and Park (1996) find that futures’ contracts can be used as an 
effective hedge against inflation. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) suggest that commodity 
futures are a better hedge against inflation than equities because they are directly linked to 
components of inflation. They also state that, because futures prices include information 
about trends in commodity prices, they rise and fall with unexpected changes from 
components of inflation. For these reasons momentum returns using commodity futures 
should be attributed to broader macroeconomic factors rather than information 
announcements and investor behaviour. 
If this were the case, then a large portion of the securities market literature that attributes 
momentum profits to investor sentiment such as under-reaction hypothesis would not be 
applicable to the futures markets. However, both Kurov (2008) and Ma et al. (1990) 
demonstrate how investor sentiment is present in the futures markets. Specifically Kurov 
(2008) shows how feedback trading (momentum) with index futures can be attributed to 
investors with positive/negative sentiments towards returns. Similarly, by studying the price 
adjustment in futures prices to significant events Ma et al. (1990) finds evidence of under and 
overreaction in commodity and financial futures contracts. Therefore it would be incorrect to 
posit that in the futures market, investor sentiment (i.e. under-reaction hypothesis) does not 
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contribute to continuation in returns. This lends support to the idea that momentum returns in 
futures contracts are derived from inefficiencies in the market. 
Although the bulk of the literature on momentum trading involves the equities market, in the 
last ten years there has been an incremental prevalence of research into the profitability of 
such strategies in the futures  markets (Miffre and Rallis, 2007; Shen et al., 2007). Miffre and 
Rallis (2007) conducted a momentum strategy on a sample of 31 commodity futures contracts 
from 1979 to 2004. The strategy adopted is similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and 
involves the following method; each month contracts are sorted into quintiles based on their 
average previous return over a ranking period of 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. The strategy then 
buys the contracts that are in the top quintile and sells those in the bottom, holding this 
position for 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. This creates sixteen momentum strategies with 
combinations of ranking and holding periods between 1 and 12 months. All the strategies 
except three (rank 6 -hold 12, rank 12 - hold 6 and rank 12 - hold 12) produced significant 
profits. Across thirteen profitable strategies, it was found that an investor could receive an 
average return of 9.8% pa by consistently buying the best performing commodity futures and 
selling the worst ones. 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) and others argue that momentum profits are a compensation for risk. 
To examine this Miffre and Rallis (2007) carry out a series of regressions to measure the 
profitability of the strategies once simple risk and time-varying risk have been accounted for. 
In the first regression, they measure the sensitivity of each portfolio’s return to the bond, 
equity, and commodity futures market in order to assess each strategies abnormal 
performance. All of the profitable momentum strategies were shown to have positive and 
significant abnormal returns, thereby disregarding any suggestions of the profits being 
described as a compensation for the risks considered. As a collaborative result to the equities 
market, it was also found that momentum profits are mainly driven by the loser portfolios 
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(Hong et al., 2000). That is, the majority of momentum profits were generated by short 
selling poorly performing contracts. Miffre and Rallis (2007) further demonstrate that 
momentum profits are not a compensation for time-varying risks as suggested by certain 
researchers in the equities markets (Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002; Griffin et al., 2003; 
Grundy and Martin, 2001). 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The data, obtained from DataStream™, comprises the settlement prices of 12 US commodity 
futures contracts. The research considers 8 agricultural futures (cocoa, coffee, corn, cotton, 
orange juice, soybeans, sugar, and wheat), 1 livestock future (frozen pork bellies), 1 precious 
metal future (gold 100oz) and 2 futures on oil and gas (light crude oil and natural gas). 
The data sample spans the period from January 1993 to January 2008. Because each strategy 
is ranked for up to twelve months, the first portfolio is actually constructed in January 1994 
with a maximum ranking period that spans back to January 1993. For the same reason the last 
portfolio is actually determined in November 2006. The maximum holding period for the 
contracts in this portfolio is then calculated twelve months later in November 2007. 
This research provides an examination of three separate periods; 1993 to 1997, 1998 to 2002, 
and 2003 to 2006. As shown in figure 1 below, each of these periods had very different 
amounts of activity in the commodity market.  The period between 1993 to 1998 saw a 
relatively flat commodity market, while during the technology boom (1998-2002) 
commodities were scarcely traded. The recent massive commodity boom is clearly shown to 
start around 2001/2002. Coincidently, the last data point considered is November 2007 which 
is relatively untainted by the recent volatility in commodity prices derived from the current 
global financial crisis. 
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3.2 Methodology 
The methodology employed in this research is similar to that as used by Jegadeesh and 
Titman, (1993) and Miffre and Rallis, (2007). At the end of every month a log of the average 
change in return (equation 1) over the previous “Ranking” period is calculated. The contracts 
are then sorted into one of three portfolios from best to worst based on their performance 
compared to the whole portfolio. The top four contracts that performed the best over the 
ranking period portfolio (in terms of return) are called the “winners” and the four contracts 
generating the worst returns are labelled the “losers”. 
       (1) 
The strategy adopted then monitors the “winner” and loser” portfolios over a designated 
“Holding” period, effectively buying the winners and selling the losers. The profitability of 
the strategy is then defined as the difference of the winner minus the loser portfolio for each 
ranking and holding combination. The strategies will be referenced by Rn-Hn throughout this 
study. R is a representation of the ranking period for a given strategy, and H is the holding 
period. 
The following regression is used to measure the profitability of the strategies accounting for 
risk. Specifically the sensitivity of each portfolio to the bond, equity, commodity futures 
market, and, subsequently, the abnormal performance of the momentum strategies in terms of 
( ) is measured. 
    (2) 
 is the return of the winner, loser, or momentum portfolio.  and  are the 
returns on Datastream™ government bond index, the S&P500 composite index, and GSCI 
(Goldman Sachs Commodity Index) respectively,  is the risk-free rate of return and  is 
an error term. 
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A further regression is employed to examine whether the SMB and HML factors from the 
Fama and French (1993) three factor model, offer an explanation for momentum returns.  
 
          
(3) 
SMB is a factor that relates to the performance of small stocks relative to big stocks (Small 
Minus Big). HML is a factor that relates to the performance of value stocks relative to growth 
stocks (High Minus Low). The factors have been taken from Kenneth French’s web site 
(French, 2008), and are calculated as follows. 
SMB is the average return on three small portfolios minus the average return on three big 
portfolios. Each portfolio is formed with NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks using 
capitalisation and the book-to-market ratio. 
 
       (4)       
HML is the average return on two value portfolios minus the average return on two growth 
portfolios. 
    (5)      
There is the possibility that the momentum profits are a compensation for time-varying risks 
as in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Griffin et al. (2003), Grundy and Martin, (2001), 
Lewellen and Nagel, (2006), and Wu, (2002). The following model therefore allows for the 
measures of risk and abnormal performance to vary over time as a function of , a vector 
of pre-specified information variables. 
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       (6)
           
 consists of the twelve month lag return of the dividend yield on the S&P500 composite 
index, the term structure of interest rates, and the default spread. The term structure is 
measured as the difference between the yield on US Treasury Bonds with 10 years to 
maturity and the US three-month Treasury Bill rate. The default spread is measured as the 
difference in yield between Moody’s Baa and Aaa-rated corporate bonds.  These variables 
have been identified in similar studies such as Christopherson et al., (1998) to be good market 
predictors.  
4 Results and Analysis 
4.1 Momentum profits over the entire sample period (1994-2006) 
Table 1 displays the summary of statistics for returns of the short term momentum strategies 
analysed. The columns represent the ranking periods (1 to 12 months) and the rows the 
holding periods (1 to 12 months). Table 1 clearly demonstrates that only the R1-H1 strategy 
produces abnormal returns of 7.7% pa significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Miffre and Rallis (2007) who observe profitable momentum returns for 
the rank 1 month hold 1 month strategy. The next best strategy of the period is the R12-H1 
strategy yielding an annualised return of 3.74%, which is only just out of the 10% 
significance range. Most of the other strategies do not generate positive returns, and none 
produce significant statistics. Apart from the two previously mentioned strategies, the only 
other strategies that produced positive returns are the R1-H6, R12-H1, and the R12-H3 
(however this should be analysed with some caution as they are not significant).   
Over the same sample period, a long-only strategy that equally weights the 12 commodity 
contracts lost an average of 4.32% a year, while a short-only strategy generated gains of 
almost an identical amount. This result is further conveyed in table 1. Across the 16 strategies 
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the loser portfolio in all cases yields a negative average return that varies from a low of -
7.74% pa (for the R1-H1 strategy) to a high of -2.82% pa (for the R12-H1 strategy). The data 
from the winner’s side of the strategies is significantly less strong. The winner portfolios 
varies from a high of -0.045% pa (for the R1H1 strategy) to a low of -6.09% pa (for the R3-
H3 strategy). Furthermore, while none of the winner portfolios show significance at the 10% 
level, eight of the strategies show significant negative returns for the loser portfolios. 
This further corroborates the work of Hong et al. (2000) and Miffre and Rallis (2007) who 
determine that the continuation in the commodity futures markets is mainly driven by the 
losers in the portfolio. This has quite significant implications for research in the equities 
markets by authors such as Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), Hong et al. (2000) and Lesmond 
et al. (2004) who show that the majority of momentum profits are being derived from short 
selling loser stocks. Given the ease of entry and exit into short futures contracts, it could be 
considered that momentum trading is better suited to the futures market rather than the 
equities market where short selling is more difficult, restricted during times of economic 
turmoil, and incurs higher costs. 
Since the majority of academic explanations for these momentum profits are associated with 
the returns being a compensation for bearing more risk, the reward-to-risk ratios are also 
reported in table 1. As would be expected, the strategy with the highest pay-off also has the 
highest risk. This is demonstrated in the rank 1 month -hold 1 month strategy, where although 
the return is 7.7% pa, the risk in terms of standard deviation is an astounding 38.63% pa.  
As previously mentioned, commodity futures have experienced three distinct trends over the 
sample period. It is therefore useful to examine the risk-reward ratios the strategies produce 
over these sub-periods. As shown in table 2, over the entire sample period (1994-2007) there 
are only five strategies that provide positive return-risk ratios. With the exception of the R1-
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H1 strategy, all of these ratios are extremely low, indicating that the returns generated are not 
very good compensation for the risk needed to execute the strategy. 
It has been argued that recent institutional interest in commodity futures could decrease the 
accumulative profits from momentum strategies. If momentum profits have been shrinking 
over time, it would be expected that there would be evidence of lower levels of momentum 
profits over the recent periods. Although the sub period between 1998 and 2002 produced the 
most number of profitable strategies the later period (2003-2006) generated the same amount 
of positive return-risk ratios as the entire sample. It could then be construed that the profitable 
strategies are not being subsumed by the recent interest in institutional investors.  
This should be analysed very cautiously because although these strategies are generating 
positive returns, they are extremely low. Any inferences here could therefore be false. This 
concept is discussed with more detail in later sections. 
4.2 Unconditional risk explanations 
The momentum anomaly has been accredited by some academics to investors bearing more 
risk. However, most of the recent empirical work by authors such as Miffre and Rallis (2007) 
finds that momentum profits are robust to risk adjustment. This section examines whether the 
profitable strategies (although not all statistically significant) shown previously in table 1 are 
a compensation for bearing more risk. This has been done using equation (2) which regresses 
the portfolio returns against proxies for returns in the bond, equity, and commodity markets.  
Surprisingly, table 3 shows that the returns from the momentum strategies are not sensitive to 
the GSCI. With the exception of the R12-H1 strategy, the momentum portfolios are neutral to 
the risk associated with the bond market. The R1-H1 and R1-H6 strategies both demonstrate 
that the momentum returns are sensitive to the equities market, however the rest of the 
strategies show no significant relationship. 
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Only one strategy, the R1-H1 (rank one month – hold on month) has a positive significant 
alpha. It yields an annualised risk adjusted return of 8.51% a year, and is highly significant at 
the 1% level. The other strategies do not produce any significant t-statistics, although they all 
hold positive alphas. This indicates that they are being subsumed by the risk factors held in 
the three regression variables. As in table 1, the profitability of the momentum strategies is 
mainly driven by the losers. All of the loser portfolios produce negative alphas (two of them 
being significant at the 10% level), while only one strategy for the winner’s portfolio (the R1-
H1) has an insignificant positive return. The R-squared is also very low, indicating that the 
momentum returns are neutral to the risks present in the coefficients.  
To further explore the risk based explanation, table 4 shows the results from equation (3). 
This model uses the same regression as equation (2) but also includes the Fama and French 
(1993) HML and SML factors. The outcomes are quite similar to those of table 3, as only one 
strategy (R1-H1) shows significant robust returns to all of the risk factors. As with the results 
of Miffre and Rallis (2007), adding these factors to the regression reduces the size and 
significance of the abnormal returns (α). 
These results are consistent with both Grundy and Martin (2001) and Miffre and Rallis 
(2007) who demonstrate that momentum profits are not a compensation to these factors. 
 4.3 Conditional risk explanations 
Studies such as Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) claim that even though momentum strategies 
are robust to risk factors, they can be explained by a set of macroeconomic variables that are 
related to the business cycle. Miffre and Rallis (2007) elaborate that the profitability of the 
momentum strategies could be driven by the winners having higher systematic risks than the 
losers in up-markets, and lower systematic risks than the losers in down-markets. To test this 
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conjecture, equation (6) is used to examine the sensitivities of the momentum profits to a set 
of time-varying risks. 
Table 5 shows the alphas for the same five strategies that have been examined in table 3. The 
coefficients of this regression are not reported to save space and are available by request from 
the author. The results show that over the sample period there are two strategies that produce 
positive and significant alphas, the R1-H1 and the R12-H3. The fact that the R1-H1 strategy 
is not explained by time-varying risks supports the findings from the first regression. The 
second positive alpha is generated from the R12-H3 strategy, which was found to be 
insignificant in the first regression. Although this strategy is shown to be significant in this 
regression, it should be noted that in table 1 (which reports the actual momentum profits) the 
same strategy was not in the 10% significance range. 
These results can be interpreted as the R1-H1 strategy being unexplainable to time-varying 
risk measures. This understanding could be given to the R12-H3 strategy if one takes into 
account the fact that the original profits are insignificant at the 10% level 
4.4- Behavioural explanations 
As a large portion of the literature attributes the momentum anomaly to irrational investors, 
figure 2 shows the portion of momentum profits realised over the four holding periods. 
Although the returns are obviously volatile, there is a trend over the profitable strategies in 
each of the holding periods that represents a gradual decrease in realised returns as these 
holding periods increase. 
This distribution of profits across the holding periods is consistent with the evidence 
presented by Chan et al. (1996) and Hong and Stein (1999) who demonstrate that initial price 
continuation is evident over the short term (up to 12 months) until a price correction phase 
takes place. The results concur with the under-reaction hypothesis, where information is 
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being absorbed into prices too slowly as shown by Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong et al. 
(2000). This would account for the gradual decrease in average momentum returns, as 
investors realise that the new information is more important than the information that they 
have previously been using to value the contracts.  
Even stronger support for the under-reaction hypothesis stems from the fact that the highest 
momentum profits are realised in the one month holding period. This is because if the 
hypothesis holds, investors are pushing up the price for the long contracts (and down for the 
short contracts) until they become over (or under) valued. Since the futures market is a 
relatively liquid market, this effect should be more pronounced in the short term (up to 4 
weeks) where traders “push” up or down the prices, depending on their exposures. It would 
appear that the momentum profits realised in this study are consistent with investors under-
reacting to good and bad news about prices, resulting in the continuation in prices. 
The later holding periods are consistent with investor overreaction, as the holding period of 
12 months produces negative returns over all of the ranking stages. Although this study only 
examines holding periods for up to 12 months, a further analysis of holding periods of up to 
60 months would likely show an overreaction effect. That is, it would be expected that the 
short-term (1-12 months) continuation causes the prices to move away from equilibrium 
causing an overreaction in the long term (12-60 months). Once this overreaction is 
acknowledged by the market, prices corrected accordingly. This has been demonstrated in 
figure 2 to a degree, where the short term price continuation diminishes until the average 
returns are completely negative by the twelve month holding period. At this point the 
momentum effect is completely diminished, and contrarian strategies (buying past losers, and 
selling past winners) become profitable. 
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These results indicating short-run (1 to 12 months) continuation and long term (3 to 5 years) 
reversals provide further arguments towards the rejection of the risk based explanations. This 
is because if the conjecture by Conrad and Kaul (1998) holds, where momentum profits are 
obtained through the cross-sectional differences in returns, then the continuation of average 
returns should persist indefinitely. However as the results show, the momentum anomaly is 
short lived. 
These observations have significant implications towards the Efficient Market Hypothesis. If 
prices are following a random walk, then predicting future prices by examining the past price 
should be of no advantage to an investor. However as demonstrated in this research, 
constructing a portfolio based solely on previous prices does produce abnormal profits. These 
profits point towards irrational investors under-reacting to information in the market. This 
demonstration of market inefficiency is most prevalent in a portfolio that is held for one 
month, and constructed using the returns for the previous month (ie the R1-H1 strategy). 
5 Sub-periods 
As mentioned previously, the time series data sample contains three distinct trends. For this 
reason the following section analyses each of these periods, to examine the effect on the 
profitability of the momentum strategies. The summary statistics and various tables have not 
been published for this section. They are available on request from the author.  
5.1 1994-1997   
Although during the years of 1994 and 1997 the commodity market was comparatively 
inactive, this period actually generated the highest profits from momentum trading. This sub-
period produces two profitable momentum strategies. Interestingly, these strategies are the 
same two strategies as the ones identified over the entire sample period (R1-H1 and R12-H1). 
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Furthermore, these strategies are both positive and significant over this sub-period. In fact 
returns from these strategies have more than doubled to 15.6% pa for the R1-H1 strategy, and 
8.85% pa for the R12-H1 strategy. As with the profits from the complete sample, momentum 
profits in this period are largely due to the loser portfolios.  
The risk adjusted returns make further contributions to the robustness of the returns over this 
period. The regression analysis shows that both of the significant strategies discovered in this 
period are robust to the risk intrinsic to the bond, equities, and commodity market variables 
used in equation 2. The R1-H1 and R12-H1 strategies both produce positive and significant 
alphas, whereas the entire sample proved that, although the R1-H1 strategy was positive and 
significant after risk adjustments, the R12-H1 strategy was not significant, and therefore not 
robust to unconditional risks. The Fama and French (1993) risk adjusted results are identical. 
Over the sub-period the same two strategies are shown not to be a compensation for the Fama 
and French factors identified in their 1993 research5. Finally, as presented in table 5 the two 
strategies are not a result of the time-varying risk factors previously identified by Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002). 
5.2 1998-2002 
The middle of the sample was a period that could be described as a lull in the commodities 
market. The huge investor interest in the technology industry leading up the dotcom bubble, 
saw a substantial drop in the trading of commodity futures. The bubble burst as a 
manifestation of investor over-reaction in March 2000.  
The profits generated over this period have been greatly diminished compared with the 
previous period. Only the R1-H1 strategy produces positive returns of any statistical 
significance. Interestingly, the inferences drawn from table 2 were that this was the most 
profitable period, however upon closer examination this appears not to be the case. A further 
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point of significance is the change in the portion of positive returns for the winner portfolios. 
Although the vast majority of the strategies are not significant even at the 10% level, the ones 
that are at least producing positive returns are doing so mostly as a result of the performance 
of the winner portfolio. In fact twelve of the winner portfolios are generating positive 
significant returns. This indicates that over this sub-period long contracts are greatly 
outperforming short contracts, resulting in unprofitable momentum trading. 
Both the risk adjusted and the time-varying risk adjusted results provide further support for 
the R1-H1 strategy6. All of these regressions produce positive and significant returns, 
indicating that the momentum profits identified for this strategy are not a compensation for 
bearing more risk. 
5.3 2003-2006 
The final sub-period represents the era of the post technologies bubble. The commodity 
market saw incredible growth over this period, and only with the recent global turmoil has 
there been any substantial volatility. The massive increase in activity across this market may 
be expected to bring with it an increase in the average momentum profits realised for a given 
strategy. However profitability of the strategies paints a very different picture of this 
hypothesis as it was undoubtedly the worst period for momentum returns. Unlike the previous 
two sub-periods, this period shows a new significant strategy (R6-H6) that generates rather 
poor profits. Another striking feature of this period is that absolutely none of the loser 
portfolios are producing negative returns, while ten of the winner portfolios generate positive 
and significant returns. 
This result seems logical once applied to figure 1. Since the commodity futures market has 
seen continuous positive growth over the period, it makes sense that only the long portfolios 
are generating a profit. The fact that the loser portfolios are not contributing at all to the 
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profits for the momentum strategies could also be because of the low number of commodities 
used in this research. 
The risk adjusted regressions demonstrate that unlike the previous periods, the profitability of 
this strategy is not robust to risk adjustments. Both the unconditional and time-varying risk 
regressions (table 2) show that the profitability of the R6-H6 strategy (however small) is 
subsumed by the risk factors identified in the variables used. This indicates that the true 
profitability momentum strategies during this period can be described as a compensation for 
bearing a higher level of risk.  
Although table 2 indicates that the increased popularity of momentum trading by institutional 
investors has not reduced the accumulative profits from these strategies, a more complete 
analysis gives a new perspective. The reason why table 2 alludes to this is because there is an 
equal amount of profitable strategies between 2003-2006 as there is over the entire sample. 
However, upon closer examination of this period a few things become palpably clear. Out of 
the five profitable strategies only one of the strategies is significant, and this strategy only 
yields an annualised return of 2.4%. Furthermore, this negligible profit is shown not to be 
robust to the risk based regressions, indicating that it is likely a compensation for embracing 
more risk. This gives support to the argument that the increased institutional activity in 
momentum trading has diluted the profits realised in the commodity futures market. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
Recent studies have described the momentum anomaly as being a result of the behaviour of 
irrational investors, or as compensation for the use of assets bearing higher risks. It has been 
demonstrated that there are strategies that are profitable and robust to risk explanations, 
namely the Rank 1 month - Hold 1 month strategy. This strategy, in particular, shows that it 
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is not subsumed by proxies for risks derived from the bond, equity, and commodity markets 
and yields an annualised return of 7.7%. Furthermore, the profitability in the returns of this 
momentum strategy cannot be attributed to the macroeconomic risks which have been formed 
using variables that have been known to be market predictors.  
The second explanation posited for the momentum anomaly is the behaviour of irrational 
investors. This is in direct conflict with the principals of market efficiency. The behavioural 
analysis provides evidence that is accommodating to the under-reaction effect being a 
reasonable explanation for continuation in returns. The profits realised are shown to coincide 
with the under-reaction hypothesis, where investors irrationally react to new information, 
causing continuation of returns in the short-term (1-12 months). 
The sub-period examination gives an interesting perspective towards the profitably 
momentum returns, by examining three distinct periods of activity in the commodity markets. 
The first period (1994-1997) proves to be the most profitable for momentum strategies. 
Unlike the entire sample, this sub-period generates two strategies that are significant and 
robust to risk adjustments. The annualised average return for these strategies is 12.13% pa. 
The middle sub-period (1998-2002) could be described as a volatile era for the commodity 
markets. Although the returns were not as prolific as the first sub-period, it still generated a 
return higher than the entire sample. 
The last period (2003-2006) was the major bull run of the commodity markets over the 
sample period. Although the overall value of the commodity market has risen substantially 
until 2008, momentum profits were not only insufficient but they were also not robust to 
time-varying risks. The reason for the relative failure of momentum strategies appears to be 
because of the small number of contracts used to form the portfolios. Since this period 
coincided with a bull run, the majority of the commodities increased in value, resulting in 
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positive winner portfolios. However because there was only twelve contracts used, the loser 
portfolio did not yield any negative profits from short selling. The net result of this is 
extremely poor momentum returns over the sub-periods. Using a higher number of contracts 
would likely produce a better result for momentum strategies, as a higher number of contracts 
increases the change of continuation for both negative and positive returns. 
These results indicate that an investor could have earned a risk-adjusted return of 7.7% per 
annum through buying winners and selling losers ranked up to one month prior to portfolio 
formation, and holding this position for one month.  The results also indicate that during 
“flat” periods of low commodity activity, this return can be substantially increased. 
Momentum strategies were also found to be less profitable during bull and bear markets. 
There is the possibility that these strategies could be consumed by transaction costs. Although 
this avenue is a possibility for future research, this explanation seems unlikely for the 
following reasons; Transaction costs in the futures market have been established by Locke 
and Venkatesh (1997) as being of between 0.0004% to 0.033%, which is much less than the 
estimated 0.5% by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Furthermore, as Miffre and Rallis (2007) 
point out, although short selling restrictions are often imposed in the equity markets, adopting 
short positions in the futures market is as easy as taking a long position. It should be noted 
that these ideas are only inferences as this research does not consider transaction costs. 
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Figure 2 displays the average returns of momentum portfolios for the four ranking 
periods, and for holding periods of increasing length 
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Summary statistics for returns of momentum strategies 
1994-2006 
Ranking 1 month Ranking 3 Ranking 6 months Ranking 12 months
winner loser momentum winner loser momentum winner loser momentum winner loser momentu
 months
m 
Holding period of 1 month
Mean -0.0005 -0.0774 0.0770 -0.0520 -0.0386 -0.0135 -0.0462 -0.0453 -0.0009 -0.0196 -0.0570 0.0374
t -stat -(0.01) -(1.02) (2.48)
a
-(0.74) -(0.50) -(0.44) -(0.66) -(0.60) -(0.03) -(0.28) -(0.75) (1.24)
Standard deviation 0.8526 0.9409 0.3863 0.8745 0.9565 0.3827 0.8764 0.9456 0.3911 0.8821 0.9469 0.3764
Reward to risk -0.0005 -0.0823 0.1992 -0.0595 -0.0403 -0.0352 -0.0527 -0.0479 -0.0023 -0.0223 -0.0602 0.0993
Holding 3 period of 3 months
Mean -0.0492 -0.0315 -0.0177 -0.0609 -0.0302 -0.0307 -0.0524 -0.0342 -0.0181 -0.0334 -0.0491 0.0157
t -stat -(1.28) -(0.72) -(0.89) -(1.59) -(0.69) -(1.59) -(1.34) -(0.78) -(0.89) -(0.85) -(1.11) (0.80)
Standard deviation 0.4787 0.5456 0.2479 0.4770 0.5424 0.2401 0.4865 0.5473 0.2529 0.4881 0.5515 0.2442
Reward to risk  -0.1028 -0.0577 -0.0715 -0.1277 -0.0557 -0.1277 -0.1076 -0.0625 -0.0718 -0.0685 -0.0891 0.0643
Holding period of 6 months
Mean -0.0373 -0.0429 0.0056 -0.0512 -0.0393 -0.0120 -0.0401 -0.0478 0.0077 -0.0506 -0.0350 -0.0156









Standard deviation 0.3454 0.3506 0.1626 0.3434 0.3504 0.1559 0.3213 0.3745 0.1618 0.3623 0.3389 0.1677
Reward to risk -0.1081 -0.1224 0.0343 -0.1492 -0.1121 -0.0768 -0.1248 -0.1277 0.0477 -0.1397 -0.1032 -0.0933
Holding period of 12 months
Mean -0.0428 -0.0412 -0.0016 -0.0510 -0.0349 -0.0161 -0.0480 -0.0368 -0.0112 -0.0555 -0.0273 -0.0282









Standard deviation 0.2401 0.2396 0.1113 0.2392 0.2396 0.1097 0.2380 0.2449 0.1149 0.2609 0.2226 0.1208
Reward to risk -0.1781 -0.1719 -0.0142 -0.2132 -0.1458 -0.1464 -0.2015 -0.1501 -0.0974 -0.2126 -0.1225 -0.2333  
The mean and standard deviations have been annualised. The reward to risk ratio is measured as the ratio of the annualised mean to the standard deviation. The 
definition of momentum is the return give by the winner portfolio minus the loser portfolio. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
a  significant at 1% level 
b  significant at 5% level 
c  significant at 10% level
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Reward-to-Risk Ratios over sub periods 
Ranking period of  1 month
H=1 0.1992 0.3282 0.2272 -0.0663
H=3 -0.0715 -0.1438 0.0068 -0.1073
H=6 0.0343 0.0425 0.0667 -0.0643
H=12 -0.0142 -0.0243 0.0510 -0.2392
Ranking period of 3 months
H=1 -0.0352 -0.0302 0.0071 -0.1344
H=3 -0.1277 -0.2392 -0.0443 -0.0964
H=6 -0.0768 -0.1798 0.0357 -0.1914
H=12 -0.1464 -0.0859 -0.1858 -0.2283
Ranking period of 6 months
H=1 -0.0023 -0.0306 -0.0369 -0.0613
H=3 -0.0718 -0.1985 -0.2462 -0.5423
H=6 0.0477 0.1289 0.1268 0.3094
H=12 -0.0974 -0.0411 -0.0395 -0.1041
Ranking period of 12 months
H=1 0.0993 0.1922 0.0271 0.0747
H=3 0.0643 0.1375 -0.0016 0.0696
H=6 -0.0933 -0.1282 -0.1303 0.0659
H=12 -0.2333 -0.3280 -0.2824 0.0725
2003-20061994-2007 1994-1997 1998-2002
 
Table 2 reports the reward-to-risk ratios of the momentum portfolio returns over the whole sample period, and the 
three sub-periods of significance. The reward-to-risk ratio is measured as the portfolios annualised mean divided 
by is annualised standard deviation. H is a representation of the Holding period 
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Annual risk adjusted returns for the profitable momentum strategies identified in Table 1 
1994-2006 
winner loser momentum winne momentum winner loser momentum 
α 0.0080 -0.0771 0.0851 -0.0318 -0.0397 0.0079
t- stat (0.11) -(0.99) (2.70)
a -(1.12) (-1.37)
c (0.60)
βm -0.0822 0.0394 -0.1215 -0.0749 -0.0172 -0.0577
t- stat -(0.56) (0.24) -(1.86) -(1.28) -(0.29) (-2.12)
r loser 
b
βb 0.0563 0.0689 -0.0126 0.0282 0.0455 -0.0173
t- stat (0.46) (0.51) -(0.23) (0.57) (0.90) -(0.75)
βc -0.0006 -0.0055 0.0049 0.0202 -0.0007 0.0209
t- stat -(0.01) -(0.05) (0.11) (0.50) -(0.02) (1.12)
R 2 -1.66% -1.75% 0.41% -0.62% -1.41% 2.17%
α -0.0373 -0.0420 0.0047 -0.0179 -0.0495 0.0316 -0.0282 -0.0428 0.0146
t- stat -(1.41) (-1.36)
c (0.35) -(0.25) -(0.63) (1.03) -(0.70) -(0.94) (0.72)
βm -0.0348 -0.0564 0.0216 0.0095 -0.0488 0.0584 -0.0239 -0.0246 0.0007
t- stat -(0.64) -(0.88) (0.78) (0.06) -(0.30) (0.92) -(0.29) -(0.26) (0.02)
βb 0.0339 0.0422 -0.0083 0.0290 0.1088 -0.0798 0.0530 0.0759 -0.0229
t- stat (0.73) (0.78) -(0.36) (0.23) (0.80) (-1.48)
c (0.75) (0.96) -(0.65)
βc 0.0199 0.0007 0.0192 -0.0212 0.0109 -0.0321 -0.0212 -0.0236 0.0024
t- stat (0.53) (0.02) (1.02) -(0.21) (0.10) -(0.74) -(0.37) -(0.37) (0.08)
R 2 -1.22% -1.13% -0.79% -1.92% -1.52% 0.24% -1.49% -1.27% -1.70%
Ranking 1 month Ranking 1 month 
Holding 1 month Holding  6 months
Ranking 6 months Ranking 12 months Ranking 12 months
Holding  6 months Holding  1 month Holding  3 month
 
The table reports the coefficients from equation (2). α is a measure of the abnormal performance for the strategy, βm,  βb, and  βc measures the sensitivities of 
returns to the excess return on the S&P500 composite index,  the government bond index, and the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI), respectively. For 
an easier comparison with table 1, α has been annualised.  R2 is the adjusted R-Squared. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
a  significant at 1% level 
b  significant at 5% level 
c  significant at 10% level
Commodity Futures and Momentum Trading 
 




Fama and French annual risk adjusted returns for the profitable momentum strategies identified in table 1 
1994-2006 
winner loser momentum wi  momentum winner loser momentum 
α 0.0049 -0.0772 0.0821 -0.0341 -0.0403 0.0062




βm -0.1036 0.0386 -0.1422 -0.0909 -0.0212 -0.0697





βb 0.0533 0.0724 -0.0191 0.0258 0.0436 -0.0178
t- stat (0.43) (0.52) -(0.34) (0.51) (0.85) -(0.77)
βc 0.0009 -0.0044 0.0053 0.0213 -0.0008 0.0221
t- stat (0.01) -(0.04) (0.12) (0.53) -(0.02) (1.19)
βsmb 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
t- stat (0.25) -(0.11) (0.83) (0.47) (0.23) (0.52)
βhml 0.0010 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 0.0001 0.0006
t- stat (0.63) (0.17) (0.97) (1.15) (0.14) (2.20)
b
R2 -2.76% -3.07% -0.15% -1.07% -2.74% 4.10%
α -0.0387 -0.0436 0.0048 -0.0203 -0.0508 0.0305 -0.0325 -0.0478 0.0153
t- stat (-1.45)
c
-(1.40) (0.36) -(0.28) -(0.64) (0.98) -(0.80) -(1.05) (0.76)
βm -0.0451 -0.0675 0.0224 -0.0075 -0.0583 0.0508 -0.0531 -0.0594 0.0063
t- stat -(0.79) -(1.01) (0.78) -(0.05) (7.00) (0.76) -(0.61) -(0.60) (0.14)
βb 0.0320 0.0385 -0.0065 0.0250 0.1105 -0.0855 0.0381 0.0619 -0.0238
t- stat (0.68) (0.70) -(0.27) (0.19) (0.79) -(1.56) (0.53) (0.77) -(0.66)
βc 0.0205 0.0008 0.0196 -0.0206 0.0124 -0.0329 -0.0224 -0.0239 0.0015
t- stat (0.54) (0.02) (1.04) -(0.20) (0.11) -(0.75) -(0.39) -(0.37) (0.05)
βsmb 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 0.0014 0.0014 0.0000
t- stat (0.37) (0.47) -(0.37) (0.25) (0.00) (0.59) (1.28) (1.14) -(0.02)
βhml 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0007 0.0007 0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 -0.0004
t- stat (0.74) (0.51) (0.28) (0.41) (0.38) (0.00) (0.61) (0.92) -(0.85)
R2 -2.20% -2.25% -1.89% -3.17% -2.76% -0.81% -1.72% -1.58% -2.48%
Holding period of 6 months  Holding period of 1 month Holding period of 3 months
Ranking -6 months Ranking- 12 months Ranking- 12 months
Ranking-1 month Ranking 1 month 
Holding 1 month Holding period of 6 months
 
The table reports the coefficients from equation (3). α is a measure of the abnormal performance for the strategy, βm,  βb, and  βc measures the 
sensitivities of returns to the excess return on the S&P500 composite index,  the government bond index, and the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index 
(GSCI), respectively. The βhml and βsmb variables are the Fama and French (1993) factors. For an easier comparison with table 1, α has been annualised.  
R2 is the adjusted R-Squared. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
a  significant at 1% level 
b  significant at 5% level 
c  significant at 10% level
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Conditionally risk adjusted annual returns 
Rank 1 months - 







Rank 1 months - 
Hold 6 months α 0.0153 0.0138 0.0180
t -stat (1.09) (0.38) (0.64)
Rank 6 months - 
Hold 6 months α 0.0045 0.0129 0.0233 -0.0106
t -stat (0.32) (0.37) (0.82) -(0.79)
Rank 12 months - 
Hold 1 months α 0.0408 0.1623 0.0161 0.0529
t -stat (1.25) (1.92)
b (0.26) (1.05)
Rank 12 months - 




Strategy 1994-2006 1994-1997 1998-2002 2003-2006
  
The table reports the annualised conditionally risk adjusted returns of alpha for the momentum profits using 
equation (6). The entire sample period is shown along with the three significant sub-periods. The five strategies 
shown are those that were identified as profitable in table 1. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The remainder 
of the coefficients and their t-statistics are reported in appendix 1. 
a  significant at 1% level 
b  significant at 5% level 
c  significant at 10% level 
 
